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Abstract
Disappointing results and negative consequences of government reforms 
inspired by New Public Management (NPM) ideas have recently stimulated 
Public Administration scholars to  develop alternative approaches to  gov­
ernance. Prominent alternatives in current debates are the Neo-Weberian 
State, Public Value Management, new arrangements of civic participation, 
and evidence-based policy making. In this article, the authors build on a 
reconstruction of the ideas of Alasdair MacIntyre to argue that these alter­
natives are likely to  become as disappointing after their implementation as 
NPM, as they share its basic modernist and managerialist flaws. They believe 
MacIntyre's lessons for Public Administration point toward a more promis­
ing route.
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The Current Discontent About Managerialism
Since the 1980s, New Public Management (NPM) has inspired many govern­
ment reforms all over the world. Market-oriented reform strategies of the 
public sector have been introduced aiming at increasing effectiveness and 
diminishing bureaucracy and public spending (Haque, 2001; Osborne & 
Gaebler, 1992; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). Yet, over the past decade, NPM 
has become the bête noire of many in Public Administration.1 A growing 
body of literature expresses strong discontent with NPM, mainly fueled by 
disappointment with its results. Across the board, the promised advantages 
(greater efficiency and accountability, leaner and stronger governments) 
have not been achieved (Dibben, Wood, & Roper, 2004; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 
2000). The comments also point to unintended but serious side effects: Those 
now exercising power cannot be effectively held accountable; civic partici­
pation has become a farce, especially those already well-off benefit from ser­
vice provision; government rapidly looses expertise; and worst of all, NPM 
has compromised the specific character of public administration (Bozeman, 
2002; Haque, 2001).
Some of those lamenting the practice and effects of NPM have presented 
remedies. A first set of commentators prompts us to abandon the path of cre­
ating governance arrangements and networks of actors. What we need to do 
instead, they argue, is returning to classical (state) government: not a govern­
ment that is entangled in fuzzy horizontalism but one that actually steers, not 
one that is merely fine tuning markets and other competitive arrangements 
but one that is effectively in command, not one that depends on the knowl­
edge and information of all kinds of stakeholders but one that encompasses 
an expert bureaucracy. What we need is a Neo-Weberian State (Haque, 2001; 
Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). In a second line of comment, it is recalled that 
under NPM, the central value in public management, if any, is efficiency. 
According to these commentators, we should abandon this myopic focus on 
efficiency and concentrate on a broader range of values in management (Gay, 
2000; Stoker, 2006). Public managers and civil servants should not just be 
evaluated by economic criteria but rather in terms of ethics and integrity 
(Dror, 2001; Stivers, 2008). What we need is Public Value Management 
(PVM; M. Moore, 2005) or an approach of “managing publicness” (Bozeman, 
2007). Others, presenting a third advice, maintain that individuals should 
have a central role not merely as consumers but as participating citizens. The 
basic remedy against the serious problems NPM has brought on us would 
then be introducing new participatory arrangements at all levels of gover­
nance (“bringing the citizen back in”). Examples of such arrangements are
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referenda, citizen juries, client councils, and the like (Denhardt & Denhardt, 
2007; Jun, 2006). A fourth prominent voice in the current debate promotes 
evidence-based policy making. Although NPM offered one-size-fits-all solu­
tions, public administrations rather need adequate and tailor-made knowl­
edge leading to really effective interventions. Academically, this demands a 
Public Administration that provides robust causal knowledge (Davies, Nutley, 
& Smith, 2000).
The broadly shared criticisms of and the range of suggested alternatives to 
NPM are evidence of a general discomfort with that approach in public man­
agement. However, this phenomenon is remarkable in light of the earlier 
enthusiasm in Public Administration for the ideas of Osborne and Gaebler (1992) 
and their kindred. Will the approaches currently favored—Neo-Weberianism, 
PVM, civic participation, and evidence-based policy making—not be 
lamented in a few years from now? This could certainly be the case if it is not 
simply NPM that we should be concerned about but a more general orienta­
tion of which NPM is merely a species. The currently advocated alternatives 
might then belong to that very same orientation. Public Administration itself, 
in developing and advocating such alternatives, would then be part of the 
problem rather than the solution.
This disquieting suggestion finds ground in the analyses of modernity and 
managerialism offered by Alasdair MacIntyre. For MacIntyre, managerialism 
is an orientation pervading modern societies that is narrow-mindedly concerned 
with the effective realization of given aims. Although a central aspect of our 
thought and actions, it is problematic in its presuppositions and morally cor­
rupting in its effects. If NPM and the alternatives presented for it indeed share 
in this managerialism, Public Administration is clearly on the wrong track.
MacIntyre presents an incisive criticism of managerialism, but he also 
provides ideas to develop a fundamentally different alternative. Although a 
renowned and widely influential political philosopher, he is unfortunately not 
much studied by students of public administration. To be sure, one can find 
occasional references to his work in the Public Administration literature, but 
so far no attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive analysis of his 
ideas on public administration and management. A reason for the neglect of 
MacIntyre among students of public administration in particular and social 
scientists more generally seems to be that he is considered too “normative.” 
What is worse, he is often categorized as a communitarian, a conservative, a 
Catholic, a Marxist, or any combination of these and therefore disqualified 
without much further examination of his actual ideas (for instance, by Gay 
[2000], who spurns the alleged “Christian genealogy” of his ideas). However, 
dismissing MacIntyre’s thinking on these grounds is evidently too easy and
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narrow-minded. Some characterizations, furthermore, do not do justice to the 
actual position MacIntyre takes. He himself criticizes, for instance, commu- 
nitarianism as too heavily infected by liberalism—the political philosophy he 
is most adamantly opposed to.2
In this article, we aim to show that MacIntyre should not be discarded too 
easily. More specifically, we examine what analysis MacIntyre offers with 
regard to the problems of managerialism and NPM and what alternative he 
provides. In other words, what are MacIntyre’s lessons for Public Administration? 
We start, in the next section, with an overview of MacIntyre’s critical diag­
nosis of modernity. With this critique, he undermines the claims public man­
agers and students of public management can rightfully make. In the sections 
titled “The Manager’s Ethos of Neutrality” and “The Manager’s Knowledge,” 
respectively, we take a closer look at these claims concerning, first, the moral 
position of managers and, second, their knowledge and expertise. In the last 
section, we turn to the lessons that can be drawn from MacIntyre’s analysis for 
Public Administration.
MacIntyre’s Critique of Modernity
Over the last decades, many have shown serious concern about modernity 
and the sometimes postmodern developments it has engendered, for instance, 
the crumbling of traditional social and political institutions, globalization, 
and the increase of societal risks (e.g., Albrow, 1996; Beck, 1992; Castells, 
1996-1998). These concerns have led to reflections on the crisis in or even 
the end of modernity and about structural shifts toward a late modernity, a 
reflexive modernity, or even a postmodernity that we can witness develop­
ing or should try to realize. MacIntyre’s thought in many respects resembles these 
well-known critiques of modernity. His unmasking of dominant perspectives 
and his critical analysis of the impact of instrumental rationality show an 
affinity with Marxism and Nietzscheanism that brings him close to critical 
and poststructuralist schools. Yet, and that makes his approach especially 
interesting and promising, MacIntyre takes a unique turn in his diagnosis of 
modernity’s problems: He points to the alternative that premodern concepts 
and practices can offer.
Enlightenment and Emotivism
To understand the impact of MacIntyre’s criticisms and suggestions for the 
study of public administration, we must realize how this discipline developed 
and what its aims are. Public Administration aspires for a scientific base, a
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cumulative body of knowledge, and refined methodologies. Not satisfied 
with being merely a social science, it additionally aims to improve govern­
ments and thus assist them in creating a better world. Although public admin­
istration as a part of government is of course much older, and some scientific 
reflections on the subject can already be found in early modern times, Public 
Administration as a recognizable field of study primarily stems from Enlightenment 
ideas, especially positivism, developed and elaborated in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. The study of public administration, therefore, is above all a modern 
phenomenon.
Now, MacIntyre offers a very bleak diagnosis of modernity. Modern moral­
ity and science, he argues in the opening chapters of his most famous book 
After Virtue, are haunted by insoluble puzzles because they are badly con­
structed amalgams of fragments from earlier traditions. Of these earlier tradi­
tions, against which the Enlightenment reacted, one stands out: the Aristotelian 
tradition. For Aristotelians, calling a particular action just or right is to say 
that it is what a good man would do in such a situation. A good man is one 
who has developed his attitudes and abilities in the appropriate way, given his 
possibilities and capacities (MacIntyre, 1999). Basic in Aristotle’s view on 
ethics is the analogy of “a man living well” to, for instance, “a harpist playing 
well” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 58). “Man” is thus taken as a functional concept. In 
the premodern tradition, moral judgments are related to “man-as-he-could-be- 
if-he-realized-his-essential-nature.” In developing and actually “living” his 
virtues, such a man is oriented toward the telos of human life: the good life 
and, ultimately, happiness (eudaimonia).
Modern thinkers, such as Hobbes, Kant, and others, have abandoned tele­
ology. They embarked on what MacIntyre calls “the Enlightenment project,” 
the attempt to justify morality by universally accessible reason. This project 
has failed, according to MacIntyre, not because insufficient brain power was 
devoted to it but because the absence of the idea of a telos made the project 
as such fundamentally impossible. Enlightenment thinkers wanted to do 
without functional notions in ethics and therefore started from the idea of 
“man-as-he-happens-to-be” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 54). However, to start from 
actual man is insufficient to justify moral rules. Modern thinkers present 
rules and rights merely in the form of obligations and prohibitions, uncon­
nected to any idea of a good life. Individuals can claim their individual rights 
or proclaim utilitarian rules, but they cannot justify them in terms of the indi­
vidual and collective ends they are supposed to help realizing. In fact, modern 
morality amounts to little more than a set of irrational and scarcely understood 
rules, that is to say mere taboos (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 111-113).
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As a result of this failed project, MacIntyre argues, we now live in a cul­
ture dominated by emotivism. By this, he means that we have lost the belief 
that any rational or reasonable arguments can be given to justify our moral 
judgments. Instead, we regard and present them as merely unarguable prefer­
ences. Thus, for an emotivist “Thou shalt not steal” means nothing more than 
“Boo for stealing!” and “Be honest” means only “Hurray for honesty!” Apart 
from mere emotional preference, such moral judgments cannot be based on 
any further reasons. We have become utterly skeptical about the possibility 
of rationally justifying morality (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 11-12 and passim).
Importantly for us, MacIntyre’s criticism of modernity implies a frontal 
attack at the academic field of Public Administration as it stands. In its self­
understanding as a scientific discipline, it has no room for teleology. Just as 
modern moral philosophy has no idea of the telos of human life, of the good life, 
likewise modern administrative “science” (and Political Science too, for that 
matter) has no idea of a telos of society, of the good society. In this respect, 
administrative science even seems doubly emotivist because of its subordi­
nate, sometimes instrumental relation to politics.3 As modern politics is void 
of thinking about the good life and the good society, similarly, or even more 
so, modern public administration, acting as the servant of democratic politics, 
is aimless: There is no fundamental consideration of ends but only of the 
proper means to achieve those ends that happen to be favored.
The Modern State Cannot Be a Political Community
MacIntyre’s bleak diagnosis of modernity also questions the capitalist bureau­
cratic state. This institution, most famously depicted by Weber, is over­
whelmingly powerful and continuously interfering in people’s lives. To gain 
some legitimacy, it appeals to a limited conception of public interest as that 
what is necessary to enable citizens to pursue their own private ends. This 
reflects the liberal ideology that requires the state to be as reticent as possible 
in answering questions of good and bad, right and wrong. Just as moral rules 
are no longer justified in terms of a notion of the good life, likewise political 
and legal rules are not justified in terms of a notion of the good society. Thus, 
it is left unclear why citizens should feel obliged to such a state when it does 
not serve their private interests:
In any society where government does not express or represent the
moral community of the citizens, but is instead a set of institutional
arrangement for imposing a bureaucratized unity on a society which
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lacks genuine moral consensus, the nature of political obligation
becomes systematically unclear. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 254)
At the same time, to function if not survive, the modern state needs the sup­
port (and the money) of its citizens and the willingness of at least a portion of 
them to accept dangerous but necessary jobs (as police officer, fireman, or 
soldier). To this end, the state has to appeal to a larger good, but because of 
the liberal ideology it cannot do so openly and must do it surreptitiously. 
Hence, the modern state is a paradoxical and manipulative institution: On one 
hand, it claims to let its citizens (or rather clients and customers) free to fol­
low their own private preferences, whereas on the other hand it expects from 
them the highest sacrifices. What it requires from them, MacIntyre (1994) 
quips, is “like dying for the telephone company” (p. 303). The modern nation 
state is not and cannot be a genuine community and misconceptions like a 
Volk are ideological disguises for sinister realities. The public interest the 
state says to serve, let alone the collection of public goods and services it 
provides, does not truly amount to the common good (bonum commune), the 
well-being of the entire community. Communitarian thinkers who want to 
infuse community values into modern states are wrong because they opt for 
the impossible (MacIntyre, 1984, 1994, 1999, 2006).
A return to the premodern Aristotelian orientation—and it is a revitaliza­
tion of that virtue-ethical tradition that MacIntyre is after—points in a differ­
ent direction. It would mean a return to relatively small and homogeneous 
communities (MacIntyre, 1984, 1999). It is one of the mistakes of communi­
tarians, MacIntyre holds, to think that genuine modes of participation and 
virtue can be cultivated at the level of the state (1999). Therefore, on the final 
pages of After Virtue, he makes a call to retreat into small communities to 
fence out the corrupting outside world—much like monasteries in the Middle 
Ages: “What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms of com­
munity within which civility and the intellectual and moral life can be sus­
tained through the new dark ages which are already upon us” (MacIntyre, 
1984, p. 263). Out of such communities, resistance against the modern order 
should be enacted and attempts be made to reorganize current social struc­
tures against the grain of the modern ideologies (MacIntyre, 1999).
The Character o f the Manager
In After Virtue, MacIntyre (1984) argues that every culture has some typical 
figures that he calls its characters: “They are, so to speak, the moral repre­
sentatives of their culture” (p. 28). The local schoolmaster, for instance, was
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a figure who personified everything typical of Victorian England, as the mili­
tary officer did in Prussia. MacIntyre invites the reader to get an understand­
ing of our modern society by taking a closer look at the central characters of 
our society. He mentions three of them in particular: the (psychological) 
therapist, the rich aesthete, and, indeed, the manager of the bureaucratic 
(business or public) organization.4 These modern characters all take the 
objectives or values of their clients, their protégées, and their organizations, 
respectively, as given and unarguable preferences. Thus, the rich aesthete 
restlessly spends his means on ever-changing ends to fight off boredom, whereas 
the manager and the therapist employ their specific expertise to provide the 
best means to achieve predetermined ends for organizations and individuals 
(MacIntyre, 1984).
MacIntyre uses the notion of characters to show that there is something 
fundamentally wrong with modern society and its culture. He does so by 
exposing flaws in the claims that are basic to these modern characters. The 
authority of managers’ claims, in particular, rests on (a) “the existence of a 
domain of morally neutral fact about which the manager is to be expert” and 
(b) the possibility of “law-like generalizations and their application to particular 
cases derived from the study of this domain” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 77). MacIntyre 
dismisses these two assumptions of moral neutrality and scientific expertise 
as false. In the next two sections, we show how he discusses these two claims.
The Manager’s Ethos of Neutrality
MacIntyre (1979) gives an affirmative answer to a question raised in one of 
his articles: “Corporate Modernity and Moral Judgment: Are They Mutually 
Exclusive?” But why? What makes the theories and practices of modern 
management morally problematic?
Managers typically claim moral neutrality, their only aim being the “mor­
ally neutral” value of effectiveness. However, according to MacIntyre, this 
claim is false. Not only is the effectiveness of a decision or policy always 
relative to the goals at which it aims,15 but more fundamentally, the emphasis 
on managerial effectiveness itself in fact promotes a certain way of life, a 
certain culture:
[T]here are strong grounds for rejecting the claim that effectiveness is 
a morally neutral value. For the whole concept of effectiveness is . . . 
inseparable from a mode of human existence in which the contrivance 
of means is in central part the manipulation of human beings into com­
pliant patterns of behavior; and it is by appeal to his own effectiveness
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in this respect that the manager claims authority within the manipula­
tive mode. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 74)
The moral neutrality of managers is thus an important “moral fiction” of 
modern culture. It is “part of a masquerade of social control” (MacIntyre, 
1984, p. 75). Management is both an instrument and perpetrator of manipula­
tion, and especially in the case of public managers, they contribute to the 
manipulative character of the modern state.
Management is Not a Practice
To clarify his accusation of the amorality and even immorality of manage­
ment, MacIntyre introduces as a counterpoint the notion of a practice. A 
practice, in his much-quoted definition, is
Any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative 
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity 
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excel­
lence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 187).
There is a large variety of practices: apart from amusements like games 
and playing musical instruments, also certain kinds of work (in a crew of 
fishermen, for instance, or as a doctor or a teacher), and being involved in 
politics—politics, that is, in the Aristotelian and not in the modern sense. 
However, before investigating the scope of the concept, we should first clar­
ify its core meaning. Take MacIntyre’s (1984) best-known and elaborated 
example: chess (p. 188ff). If someone, say a child, wants to learn to play 
chess, he or she has to accept the authority of an instructor and of the chess 
community more generally. The practice of chess has its own standards of 
what is good chess playing. To meet them, one must learn two types of rules, 
namely, the formal rules of the game as such to play chess at all (e.g., “bish­
ops can only move diagonally”) and the more informal rules that say how to 
play well (e.g., “first conquer the midfield”). These rules are authoritative for 
chess players, although they may be changed, most commonly by the (inter­
national) chess community and a brilliant chess master.
Here enter two of MacIntyre’s most important distinctions. The first is 
between internal and external goods, or goods of excellence and goods of
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effectiveness (MacIntyre, 1984, pp. 188-191). With chess playing, or any 
other practice, one can usually gain money, honor, and the like. (In the exam­
ple, the instructor may decide to give the child a candy for every good move 
he or she makes.) But these goods could also be obtained in other ways. They 
are in principle unrelated to the particular practice of chess. Hence, MacIntyre 
calls them external goods. However, there are also goods that cannot be 
achieved in any other way than by performing this particular practice, such as 
the enjoyment and admiration of the cleverness, brilliance, and beauty of 
certain moves on the chess board (even when they are made by the opponent 
in the game). These goods cannot be obtained in any other way than in being 
involved in the game of chess (even if in the audience). Hence, these goods 
are called internal goods of the practice.
The second important distinction is that between practices and institutions 
(MacIntyre, 1984, p. 194). Chess is a practice, but the FIDE or the local chess 
club is an institution. In his work, MacIntyre mainly wants to address the 
character of ethics, of individual orientations and values, not of institutional 
rules, but he realizes such rules are obviously of great importance. However, 
to understand their full significance we should understand them in relation to 
the goods they must help to realize and sustain, not only the external but also 
the internal ones. The distinction between practices and institutions is crucial, 
but the two are also closely related. Institutions are indispensable for prac­
tices to exist, but they also often pose a threat to them:
Institutions are characteristically and necessarily concerned with what
I have called external goods. They are involved in acquiring money and 
other material goods; they are structured in terms of power and status, 
and they distribute money, power and status as rewards. Nor could they 
do otherwise if they are to sustain not only themselves, but also the 
practices of which they are the bearers. For no practice can survive for 
any length of time unsustained by institutions. Indeed so intimate is the 
relationship of practices to institutions—and consequently of the goods 
external to the goods internal to the practices in question—that institu­
tions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in 
which the ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable 
to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care 
for common goods of the practice is always vulnerable to the competi­
tiveness of the institution. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 194)
The moral problem of management, MacIntyre suggests, is that it is mainly 
occupied with the attainment of external goods at the cost of internal goods
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and with the development of institutions at the cost of practices. His point is 
not that many individual managers are greedily obsessed with money, status, 
and the expansion of their organization, although such viciousness is obvi­
ously a moral problem too. More fundamentally, his argument is that modern 
management thinking, based on the paradoxical combination of Enlightenment 
optimism and emotivist skepticism, actively helps to build the capitalistic- 
bureaucratic state and both overlooks and obstructs the realization of the 
good life and the good society.
Virtues, Narratives, and Traditions
To guarantee the well functioning of practices, and to prevent damage to them 
by institutions, virtues are of the utmost importance: “Without them, without 
justice, courage, and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting 
power of institutions” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 194). Virtues, MacIntyre (1999) 
argues, are indispensable for human flourishing, to achieve and exercise prac­
tical reason for ourselves and others. Moral rules are of importance, of course, 
but they should be understood as guidelines and never be substituted for real 
virtuous deliberation. In MacIntyre’s (1984) definition, virtues play a crucial 
role in practices and the achievement of internal goods: “A virtue is an 
acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable 
us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which 
effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods” (p. 191, italics removed). 
This can be easily understood. If someone cheats in a chess game, for instance, 
he may still gain the external goods of the game (get the honor of winning and 
the prize), but he unavoidably forfeits its internal goods. So the virtue of hon­
esty is necessary to perform a practice well. The same goes for the virtues of 
industriousness and perseverance (in practicing and training), and many other 
virtues. Some virtues are important nearly everywhere; MacIntyre (1984) dis­
cusses honesty, justice, and courage. In general, the more complex the prac­
tice, the richer the variety of virtues required.
MacIntyre (1984, pp. 199-200) himself addresses the question whether 
inherently bad activities, such as torturing, can also be a practice, sustained 
by virtues. There may, after all, be certain standards of “good” (i.e., effective) 
torturing. However, in response, MacIntyre maintains that although there 
may be practices that occasionally work as sources of evil (he actually doubts 
that torturing is a practice at all), it does not follow that we can say nothing 
against them. The very notions of virtue, moral law, and the like provide 
us with ample ammunition to condemn those activities. Thus, we can only 
speak of good torturing in a very restricted sense. This example implies an
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important lesson on management: When moral goodness is reduced to mere 
effectiveness, the worst effects of modernity become possible. So virtue is a 
crucial and indispensible element of a practice, and management cannot be a 
practice as long as it does not require and foster virtue.
Most people are of course involved in a large variety of activities, some of 
which are practices. However, to be well lived, human life has to be an inte­
grated whole, be it as a Homeric warrior king, as a citizen in the polis, as a 
bourgeois citizen, or any other alternative. Hence, after practices and virtues, 
MacIntyre adds a third building block to his practical philosophy: the notion 
of narratives (compare. Williams, 2009). To be truly virtuous, MacIntyre 
(1984) claims, human life should have a “narrative unity” (p. 208ff). 
However, for modern people, this unity is very hard to attain. Their life is 
fragmented and they do not “live a story line.” In modern society, MacIntyre 
holds, there are no appealing, coherent narratives left that instruct us about 
the good life. What we have, instead, is conflicting traditions with their own 
type of rational justification (MacIntyre, 1988). These traditions are incom­
mensurable, which implies that no common standard exists against which 
they can be measured against each other. This does not imply that they are 
equally valuable. Indeed, saying that moral traditions are incommensurable 
inevitably also makes it impossible to say that they are of equal value.6 
Clearly, MacIntyre does not regard “being a manager” as a very meaningful 
and attractive narrative.
Criticisms and Replies
MacIntyre’s bold criticisms of modernity and managerialism have, unsur­
prisingly, met with fierce opposition. It has been argued that MacIntyre’s 
case is based on weak evidence, as in After Virtue, he in fact refers to only 
three management books to support his claims (K. B. Brewer, 1997).7 
Alternative examples could be cited, of course, of books in which the manip­
ulative and effective manager is criticized. Yet, it is a mistake to argue that 
such counterexamples of managers and management literature prove 
MacIntyre’s failure. The point about characters as central figures of society, 
MacIntyre (1984) maintains, is not that there is universal assent in a culture 
about the beliefs that they express but that they are focus points for disagree­
ment: “The morally defining character of the managerial role in our own 
culture is evidenced almost as much by the variety of contemporary attacks 
upon managerial and manipulative modes of theory and practice as it is by 
allegiance to them” (p. 31). In other words, even critical management theory 
reinforces modern managerialism. Thus, there is a “ritual dance” in many
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management books, for instance in that of March and Simon, he claims, in 
which “an explicit repudiation of Weber” is followed by “an unconscious 
return to Weber” (MacIntyre, 1998, p. 65). After Weber’s bureaucracy 
model is rejected as descriptively inadequate, other models are proposed that 
are no less based on his emotivist outlook.
Critics have also maintained, against MacIntyre, that management actually 
is a practice. Individuals, after all, can develop and employ excellence in man­
agement and leadership and acquire and develop multiple virtues in organiza­
tions, they maintain (K. B. Brewer, 1997; Hine, 2007).8 The problem with these 
arguments is that they do not consider the question for the realization of which 
aims management is necessary (Beadle, 2001; Coe & Beadle, 2008). To under­
line the importance of aims, one should only recall the example of torture.
For MacIntyre, we can conclude, the manager is a character typical of 
modern culture and its failures. Moreover, management is not a practice. It is 
predominantly concerned with realizing given ends and achieving external 
goods, and violates the internal goods of respectable practices such as teach­
ing or nursing. Notwithstanding Peters and Waterman’s In Search o f 
Excellence, there are actually no standards of excellence inherent to manage­
ment. It is a masquerade behind moral fictions, especially that of neutrality 
(“only means, no ends”), but effectiveness is not morally neutral. The moral 
talk of managers is in fact little more than a mask for utterances of preference 
and manipulation in a basically emotivist society. All this is squarely at odds 
with the virtue ethics MacIntyre calls for.
The Manager’s Knowledge
In large part, MacIntyre asserts, the central role, authority, and prestige of 
managers in modern society are based on his alleged expertise. It is their 
typical knowledge that enables organizations, like state bureaucracies, to 
make policies work effectively. Not accidentally, the history of bureaucrati­
zation coincides with the development of the modern state, a state that is both 
large scale and interventionist, and the bureaucrat’s counterpart is the intel­
lectual social reformer—be it of a utilitarian, Fabian, Saint-Simonian, or 
other stripe. Governments have emphasized their bureaucratic expertise and 
thereby legitimized their social interventions (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 85).
The idea of managerial expertise thus supports the authority and power of 
bureaucrats and state alike. Yet, MacIntyre asks, what kind of expertise is it? 
And his disturbing answer is that there in fact is no genuine managerial 
knowledge. Rather, we are governed by an illusion. We are not oppressed by 
power and knowledge but by impotence and ignorance. If the manager of a
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government bureaucracy—or of a business organization, for that matter— 
turns out to be “effective” in some issue, we are actually witnessing the medi­
cine man performing a successful rain dance. Put differently, managerial 
effectiveness fulfills a function similar to the one Ayer ascribed to “God.” 
The notion of effectiveness is used to sustain and extend the authority and 
power of managers (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 76). What exactly is wrong, then, 
with managerial expertise and how can it at the same time be so successful 
in legitimizing authority?
Social Science and Sources of Unpredictability
The knowledge managers and bureaucrats would need to be effective 
includes law-like generalizations because these would enable them to predict 
and thereby control the social environment. This is the type of knowledge 
that is typically provided by the natural sciences. The expertise of bureau­
cratic managers therefore depends on a social science that aims to provide 
equivalents, for human affairs, of Newton’s laws (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 83). 
However, MacIntyre contents, the social sciences have not provided and can­
not provide such laws, and, therefore, they do not have the predictive power 
needed (1984, p. 88). In this regard, the Enlightenment project was overly 
optimistic. Despite 200 years of huge investments in terms of time, energy, 
brain power, and money, the social scientists have not been able to produce 
any sustainable law-like generalization whatsoever. The best social sciences 
can do, apparently, is offering indicative generalizations.
To sustain this claim, MacIntyre identifies a set of basic sources of unpre­
dictability in human affairs. One source of unpredictability is the simple pos­
sibility of external incidents. Second, unpredictability flows from the human 
ability to decide and makes choices. The outcome of as yet unmade decisions 
cannot be predicted. A third level of uncertainty is added when it comes to 
trying to predict the reaction (or anticipation) of some to the decisions of oth­
ers. In some settings, for instance in strategic warfare, it is profitable to act in 
unexpected ways and to be as unpredictable as possible. The last source of 
unpredictability is of a conceptual kind. It is inherently impossible to predict 
the development of radical new concepts because one would need those con­
cepts to formulate the prediction (MacIntyre, 1984, 1998).9 In this context, 
MacIntyre takes recourse to Machiavelli and his concept of Fortuna. We can 
to some extent outsmart this “bitch-Goddess” of unpredictability, but we can­
not dethrone her (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 93).
This does not mean, to be sure, that there are no predictable elements in 
social life. People coordinate their activities in all kinds of ways. There are all
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kinds of regularities—express agreements, developed routines, institutions, 
and rules—that we can more or less rely on in everyday life. Research pro­
vides us, furthermore, with all kinds of statistical regularities. These regulari­
ties and the tacit knowledge of the predictable expectations of others enable 
us to some extent to plan our lives. Yet, showing regularity is not predicting, 
let alone explaining, as it does not amount to the knowledge of causes. The 
causal explanations that can be given, moreover, give ground only for a small 
ambition for the social sciences (MacIntyre, 1984). MacIntyre, in sum, makes 
a similar point as Aristotle who pointed out that in the study of human affairs, 
we can expect much less certainty and precision than in the study of nonhu­
man reality (Aristotle, 1982). This truth about social science is, however, con­
cealed from many social scientists. Its ambition, that legitimizes its role in the 
first place, causes the misinterpretation of its real abilities.
Social Science and Its Blind Spots
MacIntyre’s first argument against managerial expertise delivered by social 
sciences, thus, is that it cannot provide what it claims: a secure body of 
causal knowledge and solid predictions on social affairs. His second com­
ment is closely linked to the idea of moral life as connected to flourishing 
practices. The guiding ideas of social science—“value neutrality” and the iden­
tification of causal mechanisms—drive them to overlook practices. Internal 
goods and the factors contributing to or hampering the flourishing of prac­
tices do not easily present themselves if one tries to avoid value judgments 
and focuses on easily identifiable causal relationships. However, external 
goods and their realization present themselves as ready candidates for research. 
Investigating how human resource management contributes to effective use 
of funds in schools fits the objectivist social scientist much better than inquir­
ing how the realization of good education can be enhanced.
However, MacIntyre argues that a completely different “sociology” is 
possible. It is one that acknowledges its value orientation, that contributes to 
the functioning of practices, and that understands how breaches of their 
integrity can be precluded or remedied. In short, “[a] sociology which aspires 
to lay bare the empirical causal connection between virtues, practices and 
institutions” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 196). It is furthermore a sociology of a 
comparative kind, investigating how different practices and institutions have 
dealt with stress and adversity, either successfully or not (MacIntyre, 1999). 
A proper social science is also one that acknowledges the fundamental dis­
agreements that always exist in practices. A history of disagreements on what 
the practice is all about (education, health care, sustaining a political community,
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etc.) is an essential part of what a practice is. Its central concepts are always 
contestable and contested. Enhancing the practice implies recognizing these 
disagreements and participating in them. Bad social science tries to neglect 
these kinds of disagreements in institutions and to reduce surfacing disagree­
ments to manageable types of conflict (MacIntyre, 1998). In fact, actions are 
often only understandable when they are understood as enacted in the context 
of a particular practice. That brings us to a last shortcoming, in MacIntyre’s 
eyes, of the yearning of social science for causal explanations. For under­
standing human action, he maintains, causal explanations do not suffice. We 
also have to take into account intentions and the meaning actions have for 
individuals in specific contexts. Here again practices are of importance: They 
provide a teleological structure that makes us understand what people reason­
ably aim at (MacIntyre, 1984, 1986; compare. Turner, 2003). In the writing 
of comparative histories, the elements of comparative research, practices, and 
contexts all come together (MacIntyre, 1973).
Social Science as Ideology
The unwarranted large ambition of the social sciences in combination with 
their neglect or suppression of important aspects of human affairs (such as 
practices), combined with their manipulative character and effect, motivates 
MacIntyre (1998) to characterize the methodology of the social sciences as 
“the ideology of bureaucratic authority” (p. 60). As an ideology, social sci­
ence masks certain kinds of conflicts over contestable concepts, and it pres­
ents an image of a world that is much more predictable and manageable than 
it really is. Indeed, to be valid, it aims to create a world to its own image: one 
that is quantifiable and predictable. Through their typical methodology, the 
social sciences try to imitate the natural sciences: They distinguish indepen­
dently identifiable variables and formulate relationships between them that 
lead to predictable changes and thus to manipulations (MacIntyre, 1998). 
Just like the natural sciences, the social sciences produce their own technol­
ogy, but it is in this case an oppressive rather than a liberating one.
It is this view that also pervades management books and studies in busi­
ness and management. They provide examples and motivate (future) manag­
ers to be successful in accomplishing goals by employing the right means. 
Different theories and books might provide different types of means—formal 
structure of the organization, informal group processes, individual motiva­
tion structures, and so on—but the drift is the same: “The kind of knowledge 
which a manager has to have is causal, expressible in generalizations, and 
must provide him with an essentially manipulative ability” (MacIntyre, 1998,
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p. 64). Managers and bureaucrats learn to use the language of effectiveness 
and expertise in presenting and defending themselves. Moreover, in their 
work they employ the concepts of social science methodology (distinguish­
ing categories, applying scores, and the like). As a consequence, bureaucratic 
authority and conventional social scientific methodology are mutually 
enforcing. Bureaucracies legitimize their authority by using the methodology 
of the social sciences, and the value and role of this methodology is under­
lined every time it seems to be actually employed. Ironically, even the unsuc­
cessful employment of social scientific knowledge stimulates the funding of 
even more research (MacIntyre, 1998).
However, in truth, social scientists are not neutral, as their methodology 
privileges certain understandings and conflicts while concealing others, and 
bureaucrats are much less effective than they claim they are (“The most 
effective bureaucrat is the best actor”; MacIntyre, 1984, p. 107). Social sci­
ence and bureaucracy join forces in neglecting and potentially undermining 
practices and thereby frustrating human flourishing and the realization of the 
common good. The legitimacy of contemporary institutions rests on a belief 
in expertise that is in fact unwarranted (MacIntyre, 1984). Of course, some 
individual managers and bureaucrats (and social scientists, for that matter) do 
occasionally acknowledge the limits of their own expertise. But, MacIntyre 
maintains, these expressions of modesty do not undermine the massive claim 
of the legitimacy of bureaucratic expertise. Sometimes, indeed, they are mere 
excuses for continuing the ideological masquerade (1984). In sum, manag­
ers’ claims to neutrality and expert knowledge are flawed, but at the same 
time these claims have a legitimizing function in modern public administra­
tion. Therefore, any serious attempt to address the negative consequences of 
current approaches in public management (NPM in particular) should imply 
a review of Public Administration as a field of study.
Renewing the Study of Public Administration
MacIntyre’s critique of modernity can help to explain the Unbehagen in our 
time with managerialism and NPM. After all, NPM can be understood as a 
typical example of a managerialist approach to increase administrative effi­
ciency. It is emotivist in its denial of the possibility of (and neglect of the 
need for) deliberation about moral ends and the common good. In addition, 
to the extent that it aspires to be scientific in its use of theories about the 
effect of incentives and competition, it yields all the negative consequences 
of a skewed focus on external goods of social practices while neglecting, and thereby 
undermining, their internal goods. Citizens are reduced to mere consumers and
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public organizations are distinguished into service providers that concentrate 
on measurable output and auditing agencies. Hence, NPM must be under­
stood as an example of the broader managerialist tendency in modernity. 
Those who want to oppose it seriously should resist this broader tendency 
and take care not to embrace just its next variant.
To escape from the endless series of variants of managerialism, we should 
go beyond the problematic scientific philosophy of Public Administration as 
it stands. There are basically two routes open to us, leading us away from a 
Weberian (i.e., modernist and emotivist) epistemology. One is the Nietzschean 
or postmodernist escape, a route that in Public Administration has been fol­
lowed, for instance, by Farmer, Fox and Miller, and several others. The other 
is one that is inspired by the premodern Aristotelian tradition. In some respects, 
MacIntyre seems to follow the postmodern path. He unmasks the modern 
self-understandings and points out the ideological character of social science 
methodology. In a way similar to the “archaeologies” of Nietzsche and F oucault, 
his diagnoses rests on a history of the development of a specific worldview. 
Yet, MacIntyre clearly does not belong to the postmodern camp. Nietzsche, 
according to MacIntyre, remains too close to the modernist point of view. In 
an important sense, Weber and Nietzsche (and Marx, for that matter) are of 
the same category: They all share in the modern rejection of teleology. Central 
in modern thought is, as we have seen, the effective realization of given indi­
vidual preferences. Eventually, Nietzsche’s focus on the will (Wille) expresses 
this very orientation (MacIntyre, 1984).
Against both modernists and postmodernists, MacIntyre argues that it was 
a major mistake to abandon Aristotelianism in the first place. However, it can 
still be revitalized (MacIntyre, 1984). How exactly this could be realized and 
what it would imply for society at large is a subject that falls outside the 
scope of this article. We concentrate on implications of such a renewal of 
Aristotelian thinking for Public Administration. Developing MacIntyre’s 
viewpoint beyond its explicit elaboration, we think we can now offer three 
main lessons for Public Administration and connect them to the recently pro­
posed alternatives for NPM.
A Modest Public Administration
First of all, MacIntyre presents sound reasons for lowering our expectations 
of the social sciences. Surely, they can identify statistical correlations, regu­
larities, conventions, and routines that make it quite reasonable to have cer­
tain expectations of other people’s behavior. However, on the level of causal 
knowledge and law-like generalizations, we should be aware of the limited
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powers of science in human affairs. A modest Public Administration is aware 
of its limits and recognizes and respects the role of Fortuna. Social science 
is still possible, but it should be one that focuses on comparing the function­
ing of specific practices and communities to get insight into successful and 
failing ways to deal with stress or adversity (MacIntyre, 1984, 1999).
A modest Public Administration is also one that takes due consideration of 
the importance of tacit knowledge for the realization of public goals through 
professional organizations.10 Organizations as practices have their own tradi­
tions in which relevant implicit knowledge has become accumulated and 
passed on by exemplary action from skilled new members.
From this viewpoint, the current advocates of evidence-based policy mak­
ing (Davies et al., 2000) are right in their urge to differentiate between con­
texts and steer clear of a one-size-fits-all approach. However, in its quest for 
hard causal knowledge, it tends to overestimate the possibilities of social sci­
ence, contributing thereby to an illusory promise of control and effectiveness. 
It furthermore tends to focus not on practices and internal goods but on the 
accomplishment of external goods and manipulative relations, which is mor­
ally pernicious.
A Public Administration That Fosters Practical Wisdom
Second, the value of Public Administration might not (primarily) lie in pro­
viding instrumental knowledge to practitioners but in supporting rational or 
prudential administration in another way. MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism pro­
vides an alternative for the Weberian conception of rational government. As 
a discipline, Public Administration can contribute in different ways to the 
prudence (phronesis) of administrators. It might, for instance, assist and train 
policy makers and public administrators in developing moral and profes­
sional excellence. This perspective seems to connect most closely to the 
tradition that Raadschelders (2008) calls “practical wisdom”: a philosophical 
approach to public administration, understood as a form of practical reason­
ing (compare. Nieuwenburg, 2003).11 It involves programs that trigger 
bureaucrats and politicians to clarify the (hierarchy of) goods that are at stake 
in the practices in which they are involved. It means assisting them to fight 
the corrupting instrumental tendencies in their own thought and in organiza­
tional orientations. Part of it would be identifying important virtues and 
dealing in an appropriate manner with practice-undermining institutions. All 
such training programs would foster an orientation alternative to the one in 
which the effective realization of some given ends is central.
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Above we mentioned the PVM alternative for NPM. Prima facie, this 
PVM approach seems to share sides with MacIntyre in its critique of a mana­
gerialist, single-minded focus on the instrumentalist values of effectiveness 
and efficiency. Like PVM, MacIntyre does not simply abandon efficiency 
and the striving for external goods. His acknowledgment of the double nature 
of every organization leads him to a more sophisticated position. Efficiency 
and the realization of external goods are indispensable for any functioning 
practice, as they are for any individual person (MacIntyre, 1984). It is of the 
greatest importance to find a correct balance between realizing external and 
internal goods in a practice. However, to this end, the alternative PVM offers 
is insufficient. In MacIntyre’s line of reasoning, not just a shift in values in 
public administration is necessary but a complete change in normative 
approach. From his viewpoint, the problem with PVM is not its focus on 
public values but its managerialist outlook. Abandoning that outlook would 
have consequences, for instance, in leadership studies. A virtue-ethical focus 
would here emphasize the importance of exemplary behavior and administra­
tive excellence (Hart, 1994). True virtue is shown not in intentions or in 
words but in action (MacIntyre, 1999). A further example, one that to some 
extent has already been developed by Terry Cooper (1987), is that of ethics 
and integrity in public administration. Integrity and ethical conduct in a virtue- 
ethical approach is not about sticking to the rules but about safeguarding and 
furthering the common good.
A Public Administration Engaged 
in Realizing the Bonum Commune
According to MacIntyre, the credo of neutrality and objectivity tends to lead 
social scientists on the wrong path. It gets them involved in efforts to increase 
the manipulative potential of bureaucracies. However, a proper Public 
Administration should acknowledge its duty to the practice of sustaining the 
political community. A meaningful (and not self-deceiving) orientation for 
Public Administration lies in the acknowledgment of this value orientation.
The telos of politics and administration as practices is the common good, 
the bonum commune, which is different from the public interest or general 
good as it is mostly understood in modern theories. The public interest in 
such theories is understood to be an aggregation, in one way or another, of 
individual preferences. However, the bonum commune in several ways dif­
fers from such a conception. It is concerned with the desirable (virtuous) 
development of individuals and not just their current preferences. The real­
ization of the good itself, furthermore, involves some participation of the
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members of the community. Participation, moreover, is one way of develop­
ing one’s virtues and competencies (MacIntyre, 1984, 1999). A properly con­
ceived study of public administration offers advice that contributes to the 
development of communities and participation in which this type of bonum 
commune can be realized.
The Neo-Weberian State approach, one of the current alternatives for 
NPM, shows itself to be concerned with the diminishing publicness of public 
administration. With their lack of orientation on practices and internal goods, 
governance systems and networks of competing organizations are typical 
parts of the world of managerialism. On this point, the Neo-Weberian State 
approach offers a critique analogous to that of MacIntyre. However, the two 
diverge in their view on the proper fostering of political community and orga­
nization. MacIntyre combines a consideration for small organizations with 
the idea of an encompassing political community. Such a political commu­
nity is guided, furthermore, by the general virtues of justice, courage, and the 
like. It can be a state that protects and facilitates local organizations, but it 
cannot be a (Neo-) Weberian state. To realize the same forms of community 
and practice on the state level as one has on the local level would demand 
exactly the type of bureaucracy that undermines these very ideals (MacIntyre, 
1984, 1999). The alternative to NPM networking is thus not a monolithic and 
bureaucratic state but a cooperative venture of practice institutions oriented 
toward the common good.12 The organization of political and administrative 
practice is in need of another type of theory, one that balances the realization 
of internal and external goods through a proper organizational design.13
MacIntyre’s analysis on this point also urges us to correct another widely 
advocated approach: the one that promotes civic participation. Its advocates 
criticize NPM for reducing citizen involvement to the customers’ use of pub­
lic goods and services. Now, for MacIntyre as well as them, the pure rent- 
seeking, interest-based orientation of consumers is clearly at odds with the 
idea of individuals as social, excellence-seeking persons. But the proper 
involvement of citizens in political communities—politics as a practice— 
does not simply mean supporting the types of interest representation that are 
currently proposed (referendums, citizen’s juries, and so on at all levels of 
government). First of all, we must make sure that these new forms of partici­
pation not only give a voice to citizens to promote their private interests but 
also that they really can contribute to training in the virtues and the realiza­
tion of the common good. Second, we should not try to introduce certain 
forms of reasonable debate on levels at which they cannot function. Real 
deliberation and participation on the level of a state, more specifically, is illu­
sory. To be sure, states seem to be a noneliminable feature of the contemporary
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landscape; they even provide certain preconditions for the realization of the 
common good and human flourishing, such as security, basic goods, and the 
like. However, the relevant kind of community for proper participation can 
only exist on a local level (MacIntyre, 1984, 1999).14 Although not a com­
munitarian, MacIntyre thus provides philosophical support for similar argu­
ments to strengthen local communities defended by others in and out of Public 
Administration (e.g., G. A. Brewer, 2003; Putnam, 2000).
In conclusion, MacIntyre identifies in modernity a strong tendency of 
managerialism. Efforts to counter NPM that are not based on a deep aware­
ness of this tendency are prone to become part of it themselves. Currently 
advocated alternatives for NPM—such as the Neo-Weberian State, PVM, 
civic participation, and evidence-based policy making—might share that 
fate. MacIntyre’s critical diagnosis of managerialism and his advocacy for an 
Aristotelian, virtue-ethical approach can help us to avoid that Public 
Administration will (again) become part of the problems it tries to remedy.
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Notes
1. In  this article, w e w ill use  “Public A dm inistration” (w ith capitals) to refer to the 
academ ic field o f  study and “public administration” (without capitals) to refer to the 
p rac tice  o f  governm ent th a t is the  o b jec t o f  th is fie ld  o f  study. A nalogously , 
th e  nam es o f  o ther academ ic fields are also capitalized (e.g., “ Econom ics”). In 
this vein, “the study o f  Public A dm inistration” w ould  refer to m etareflection  on 
the  academ ic field itself.
2. It is im portant to m ake this point, because in the  field o f  Public A dm inistration 
there is also a  self-declared com m unitarian substream  (o f Robert Denhardt, Terry 
Cooper, and others) opposing NPM . H ow ever, its adherents do not and cannot 
draw  on M acIntyre. M acIntyre (1994) argues that the  m odern  bureaucratic state 
is no t a  suitable m eans to foster the com m on good. In  his later w ork (1999), he 
points out that a  state is m uch too large and diverse for the type o f com m unity 
com m unitarians w ant to m old  it into.
3. In  this line, m anagem ent consultants seem  even m ore deeply  emotivist: They 
accept as given the goals o f  the directors o f  the organization they  advise.
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4. T hat there are in fact m ore characters o f  our society is suggested near the end o f 
A fte r  Virtue, w here M acIntyre (1984) refers to “ (t)he bureaucratic m anager, the 
consumerist aesthete, the therapist, the protester and their numerous kindred” (p. 256). 
In  the  preface to the th ird  edition o f  A fte r  Virtue (p. xiii) M acIntyre adds still 
another character: the conservative m oralist. This is a  figure he h im self certainly 
w ants no t to be. In  fact, he  is rem arkably  critical o f  (neo-) conservatism , w hich he 
scorns for its individualism  and m odernism  (1984).
5. The sam e point w as forcefully and v iv id ly  m ade by  W aldo (1984) in The A dm in is­
trative State: “Things are no t sim ply ‘efficient’ or ‘inefficient.’ T hey are efficient 
or inefficient for given purposes, and efficiency for one purpose m ay m ean inef­
ficiency for another. For the purpose o f  killing  a  bear, for exam ple, a  large-bore 
rifle  is m ore efficient than  a  bag o f  m eal, bu t for the purpose o f  keeping a  bear 
alive, the reverse is true” (p. 193).
6. So, M acIntyre is not a  m oral or cultural relativist. Despite the incom m ensurability 
o f  m oral traditions, it rem ains possible, M acIntyre argues, to stick to one m oral 
tradition rather than  another. This is the case, namely, w hen one tradition is able to 
solve problem s that rem ain insoluble in another (on this issue see M acIntyre, 1988).
7. The three  m anagem ent books are as follows: W eber (no titles), R. Lickert, N ew  
Patters o f  M anagem ent (1961), and Jam es G. M arch & H erbert A . Sim on, O rga­
nizations (1958). H ow ever, from other sources, w e learn  that he know s his Per- 
row , B urns, and Stalker, and others too (M acIntyre, 1979).
8. The question  w hether a  certain  activity  can  be understood as a  practice has been 
ra ised  for journalism  (Lam beth, 1990; Salter, 2008), nursing (Sellm an, 2000), 
teaching (Higgins, 2004), business (Beadle, 2008; Dobson, 1997; M oore &  Beadle, 
2006; W icks, 1997), and public  relations (Leeper & Leeper, 2001).
9. In  his reply  to M acIntyre, Levine (1983) cites M ax W eber, who pointed  out 
sources for unpredictability  in the natural sciences (developm ent o f  new  spe­
cies, the path  o f  a  tornado, the d irection o f  an  avalanche). Yet, Levine misses 
M acIn tyre’s poin t w ho claim s that social sciences and natural sciences basically 
do not differ on this particular issue. It is the consequences o f  free w ill (in the 
second source o f  unpredictability) and the constructivist point (in the last source) 
that in M acIntyre’s v iew  m ake the difference.
10. In  this respect, M acIntyre’s A ristotelian understanding o f  the social nature o f  p rac­
tices and the need to acquire skills in contexts w ith their ow n traditions and stan­
dards bears som e sim ilarities w ith ideas developed by M ichael Polanyi (1966).
11. F lyvbjerg (1998, 2001) offers an  interesting attem pt to develop a “phronetic” 
social science along A risto telian  lines and applies it to a  concrete case o f  city 
politics in A alborg, D enm ark (although then m ixed w ith a  dose o f  M achiavellism  
and N ietzscheanism  that w ould  less fit M acIntyre).
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12. In  an  im portant sense, M acIntyre’s diagnosis o f  m odernity  is close to that o f  
W eber. W eber w as also aw are o f  the m anagerialist tendency in m odernity  and o f  
the  problem s that entails. H e m etaphorically  presented  these problem s as the iron  
cage: M odernity  prom ises citizens freedom  and autonom y but leads to them  being 
contro lled  and oppressed. The advocates o f  the N eo-W eberian  State, in their op ti­
m ism , neglect this side o f  W eber’s m essage com pletely. Critics o f  M acIntyre, 
G ay (2000) for instance, also m iss this point in trying to defend “W eber’s m oder­
n ity” against him. B y  their appeals to W eber, these thinkers actually  underm ine 
their ow n argument.
13. See, for instance, H alliday  and Johnson (2010) for a  first sm all attem pt in this 
direction.
14. B y  the way, local com m unities are no t good per se, according to M acIntyre. O f 
im portance is the existence o f  netw orks o f  sm all-scale com m unities and organiza­
tions that can  function as practices in w hich individuals can becom e virtuous and 
function as “ independent practical reasoners” (1999, pp. 81, 133-135, 142).
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